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MATS LAB SEMINAR (MAAS)

不對稱且不確定信息下的

建設(shè)-經(jīng)營-轉(zhuǎn)讓道路最優(yōu)合同

講座時(shí)間

2022年5月12日 10:00

講座方式

騰訊會議ID：377-177-441

主講人

石莎莎

01主講人介紹

石莎莎，中南大學(xué)商學(xué)院副教授。研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)镻PP項(xiàng)目管理決策問題、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和拍賣理論等。已在

02講座內(nèi)容

交通基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施資產(chǎn)的開發(fā)和運(yùn)營越來越依賴于建造-運(yùn)營-轉(zhuǎn)讓（BOT）方式，即私營企業(yè)自費(fèi)建造和運(yùn)營道路項(xiàng)目，并收取通行費(fèi)，以在預(yù)定的特許期內(nèi)收回其投資成本?；贐OT道路項(xiàng)目中普遍存在的信息問題，本講座將針對信息不對稱和不確定性條件下政府與私營企業(yè)之間的最優(yōu)BOT合同進(jìn)行講解。通過將BOT合同視為道路通行能力、收費(fèi)和補(bǔ)貼的組合，我們研究了在不對稱和不確定的建設(shè)成本信息下的最優(yōu)合同。我們的研究表明，我們的研究表明，相對于對稱信息契約，不對稱信息的最優(yōu)契約是扭曲的，這是為了確保企業(yè)沒有動機(jī)誤報(bào)其真實(shí)信息，并且這一扭曲效應(yīng)會在信息不確定環(huán)境下放大。通過研究最優(yōu)合同的性質(zhì)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)誘使企業(yè)如實(shí)報(bào)告其信息將增加BOT道路的最優(yōu)通行時(shí)間，進(jìn)而降低道路服務(wù)質(zhì)量、造成社會福利的損失。然而，信息不對稱程度越高并不一定會造成更大的社會福利損失，當(dāng)信息不對稱程度服從不同的概率分布時(shí)，其對社會福利損失的影響也不同。

In recent years, the development and operations of transportation infrastructure assets have increasingly relied on the build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach, where a private firm builds and operates a road project at its own expense and charges a toll to recover its investment cost during a predefined concession period. Motivated by the prevalent informational problems in BOT road projects, we study the optimal BOT contract between government and private firm under information asymmetry and uncertainty. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of road capacity, toll and subsidy, we investigate the optimal contract under asymmetric and uncertain information concerning construction cost. Our study indicates that the optimal BOT contract under asymmetric information is distorted relative to the symmetric-information contract, which is to ensure that the firm has no incentive to misreport its cost information. By investigating the properties of the optimal contract, we find that enticing the firm to report its information truthfully will increase the optimal volume/capacity ratio of the BOT road. It also causes a loss in social welfare. However, a higher extent of information asymmetry will not necessarily yield greater loss in social welfare, and the effect of the extent of information asymmetry on welfare loss differs when it follows different probability distributions.

信息來源 / 凌 帥

封面來源 /廖蔚然

底圖制作 / 谷葉馨

圖文編輯 / 谷葉馨

責(zé)任編輯 / 李 庚