蘭州大學(xué)至公會(huì)計(jì)論壇第15期:紐約城市大學(xué)李雪君教授


應(yīng)管理學(xué)院運(yùn)營(yíng)與財(cái)務(wù)管理研究所羅勁博教授邀請(qǐng),紐約城市大學(xué)李雪君教授將做客至公會(huì)計(jì)論壇,并帶來(lái)精彩報(bào)告。歡迎感興趣的老師和同學(xué)參加!
應(yīng)管理學(xué)院運(yùn)營(yíng)與財(cái)務(wù)管理研究所羅勁博教授邀請(qǐng),紐約城市大學(xué)李雪君教授將做客至公會(huì)計(jì)論壇,并帶來(lái)精彩報(bào)告。歡迎感興趣的老師和同學(xué)參加!
講座主題:Why Do Firms Withhold Loan Contract Details?
An Incomplete Contracting Explanation
主講人:李雪君 教授
主持人:羅勁博 教授
講座時(shí)間:2020年11月10日(星期二)
10:00—12:00
講座地點(diǎn):Zoom線上會(huì)議
會(huì)議密碼:lzu
會(huì)議ID: 873 5762 6185
主講人簡(jiǎn)介
李雪君,紐約城市大學(xué)柏魯克分校(Baruch College)會(huì)計(jì)系終身教授、博士生項(xiàng)目主管。本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)經(jīng)管學(xué)院,碩士畢業(yè)于伊利諾伊大學(xué)香檳分校,并在密歇根州立大學(xué)獲會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。曾任教于羅徹斯特大學(xué)西蒙商學(xué)院。主要研究領(lǐng)域是證券監(jiān)管、企業(yè)信息披露、媒體與資本市場(chǎng)。研究成果發(fā)表于The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Management Science等國(guó)際頂尖刊物。
講座簡(jiǎn)介
Theory suggests that greater information asymmetry between firms and lenders entails allocating stronger decision rights to the latter through tighter covenants. While tighter covenants could be more likely violated, they are often relaxed later, upon contract renegotiation. We hypothesize that in such an incomplete contracting framework, greater information asymmetry gives firms more incentives to withhold information about the initial covenants from the public, to avoid overstating contractual constraints and preclude harmful reactions to violations that may be cured via renegotiations. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Our findings are stronger when contracts likely contain more performance covenants to facilitate more frequent decision right transfers to lenders. Our inferences are robust to controlling for firms’ obligation to disclose (i.e., contract materiality), proprietary costs, and future performance. While prior research has long recognized that the details of a significant portion of loan contracts are not publicly available, we are the first to provide an explanation from the incomplete contracting perspective.
(本文轉(zhuǎn)載自蘭州大學(xué)管理學(xué)院 ,如有侵權(quán)請(qǐng)電話聯(lián)系13810995524)
* 文章為作者獨(dú)立觀點(diǎn),不代表MBAChina立場(chǎng)。采編部郵箱:news@mbachina.com,歡迎交流與合作。
備考交流

掃碼關(guān)注我們
- 獲取報(bào)考資訊
- 了解院?;顒?dòng)
- 學(xué)習(xí)備考干貨
- 研究上岸攻略
最新動(dòng)態(tài)
推薦項(xiàng)目
活動(dòng)日歷
- 01月
- 02月
- 03月
- 04月
- 05月
- 06月
- 07月
- 08月
- 09月
- 10月
- 11月
- 12月
- 07/03 預(yù)約席位 | 7月3日交大安泰EMBA招生說(shuō)明會(huì)
- 07/05 最高可獲得2萬(wàn)元獎(jiǎng)學(xué)金| 上理管院專業(yè)學(xué)位項(xiàng)目2026聯(lián)合招生發(fā)布會(huì)&MBA/MPA/MEM職業(yè)賦能工坊第三期開(kāi)放申請(qǐng)中!
- 07/05 財(cái)務(wù)人必修的戰(zhàn)略思維課|復(fù)旦MPAcc公開(kāi)課報(bào)名
- 07/05 財(cái)務(wù)人必修的戰(zhàn)略思維課|復(fù)旦MPAcc公開(kāi)課報(bào)名!
- 07/05 【預(yù)告| 7.5北大國(guó)發(fā)院EMBA體驗(yàn)日】“導(dǎo)師·同學(xué)共話會(huì)” 邀您走進(jìn)北大承澤園
- 07/05 上海場(chǎng) | 清華-康奈爾雙學(xué)位金融MBA項(xiàng)目上海場(chǎng)公開(kāi)課暨招生說(shuō)明會(huì)誠(chéng)邀您參與!
- 07/05 上海交大MTT招生開(kāi)放日
- 07/05 鄭州活動(dòng)預(yù)告 | 7月5日交大安泰MBA全國(guó)巡展即將來(lái)到中原大地,招生政策、考生激勵(lì)、項(xiàng)目生態(tài)一場(chǎng)活動(dòng)全掌握!
- 07/05 海π智鏈 商道新生 | 2026東華大學(xué)MBA/EMBA/MPAcc/MEM/MF/MIB培養(yǎng)體系煥新發(fā)布會(huì)即將啟幕!
- 07/05 活動(dòng)報(bào)名 | 7月5日深圳招生直通車,15年零售餐飲O2O行業(yè)學(xué)長(zhǎng)以夢(mèng)為馬,為何選擇交大安泰MBA?